The recent statement from Gnosis illustrates the successful introduction of the Hashi oracle aggregator targeting to secure blockchain bridges from hacking. The update indicates that Gnosis is building upon the success realized in Gnosis Safe multi-sig alongside Gnosis Chain in the new protocol.

Priority to Secure Bridges from Hacking

Gnosis chief executive Martin Köppelmann portrays the protocol as improving security in the bridges since more than a single participant is needed to validate withdrawals before their confirmation.

The validation-oriented protocol is attracting industrial acceptance, particularly from LayerZero, LiFi, Wormhole, and Celer, citing their heightened vulnerability to hacking.

The announcement revealed multiple bridge protocols committed to the Hashi integration, including Axiom and Succinct Labs. Also, ZK Collective and DendrETH are joining Wormhole, Celer, and LayerZero into the protocol, where LiFi has already accepted participation.

Hashi Set to Save the Billion of Dollars Vulnerable to Hackers

Köppelmann observes that the Hashi aggregator would save the bridges the billion-dollar wealth they would have lost to the hackers. He cited Token Terminal estimates that bridges losses in 2021 and 2022 to hacking exceed $2 billion.

Köppelmann decried the existence of bugs within the codes as the facilitative channels for hacking bridges. Additionally, advanced hackers are now assuming control over the multi-sig governance wallet.

Köppelmann considers Hashi the gateway that would expedite efforts towards securing the cross-chain transactions in the entire blockchain ecosystem. The validation of withdrawals is set to replicate the validation process deployed by mining blockchain blocks across all devices in the network. Similarly, withdrawals prompt multiple bridges to validate the transaction rather than a single one whose security exploiters easily override.

Prioritizing Authentication of Transactions in Bridges

Hashi protocol involves the creation of aggregators compatible with various bridges to reach an agreement on a similar request. Köppelmann portrayed the protocol as prioritizing the authentication of commands. Disagreement would prompt escalation to the governance, signaling the need to terminate and lock the bridge.

Köppelmann reiterated the capability of the Hashi protocol in preventing multi-sig governance exploits. He added that such is possible since the protocol can prohibit governance from intervening in the absence of disagreement amongst the individual bridges.

Köppelmann explained the existence of a distinct tradeoff that prevents the governance from doing anything. The tradeoff helps avert protocol interference with the system’s operations unless during explicit conflict and bug detection.

Disagreements Set to Trigger Governance Interference

Hashi operates in a manner that the occurrence of disagreement among bridges mandated to report on similar subjects would prompt governance to interfere. The absence of such disagreement renders the governance role nonexistent.

Köppelmann lauded the Hashi protocol design as deploying open-source features readily available on GitHub. The launching of the Hashi aggregator gained prominence in a debate involving the Uniswap bridge. The January-December debate fronted the viability of establishing multi-bridge aggregation to avert exploits reining problems for the bridges since 2021.

Replicating the multi-validation process gained support from bridges left writhing following exploits. The participants in the debate settled on Wormhole before unanimously choosing the aggregator provider as Uniswap.

In support, deBridge executives in the debate joined the call by Celer and LiFi, who led other participants in proposing a multi-bridge aggregation as supreme to avert the exploitation challenge that threatens their existence.